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I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises, in part, from Taylor's motion for reconsideration that included the
submission of additional declarations from Taylor, his expert Professor McDermott and the
undersigned counsel, which were all timely served within two weeks of when the district court
entered the two "Final Amended Judgments", certified as final in accordance with I.R.C.P. 54(b),
in favor of Riley and HTEH on October 9, 2015. 1 (R. 6322-79 (A. 123-56)2.)
At oral argument, Justice Eismann raised for the very first time on appeal the issue
regarding whether Taylor's motion for reconsideration was timely given that there had been a prior
partial consent judgment dismissing Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow from the lawsuit on
September 18, 2015 and Taylor's motion to reconsider was not served within two weeks of that
judgment. (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32) 3.) Taylor maintained at oral argument the partial consent
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final judgment
and could not retroactively make the prior partial judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH
final ones. Justice Eismann 4 suggested otherwise, which led to this Supplemental Appellant's
Brief.
For the reasons discussed below and with the utmost of due respect to Justice Eismann,
Taylor maintains his position at oral argument was correct based on the facts and circumstances

1 For convenience of the Court and the parties, Taylor will use the same abbreviations for
the parties that he used in prior briefing. (Appellant's Br. at 1.)
2 Taylor's citation to "A." in this Supplemental Brief is to the Appendix attached to his
original Appellant's Brief.
3 Taylor's citation to "SA." in this Supplemental Brief is to the Appendix attached to this
Supplemental Brief.
4 The undersigned found Justice Eismann's memorandum on judgments most helpful.
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of this case and the clear and unambiguous language ofl.R.C.P. 54. The partial consent judgment
entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (SA. 30-32) was merely one of five
partial non-final judgments entered in this multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit and "any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." I.R.C.P.
54(b) (2015). 5 Thus, the Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbow judgment was simply a partial

judgment.
Simply put, the three non-final partial judgments entered separately in favor of Riley (SA.
19-20), Hawley Troxell (SA. 21-22) and Eberle Berlin and Turnbow (SA. 30-32) do not
independently or collectively comply with I.R.C.P. 54 and they do not, and cannot, independently
or collectively constitute one final ''judgment" as required by I.R.C.P. 54. Moreover, the record
(including the augmented portion) conclusively establishes that, inter alia, it was not the district
court's intent, nor the parties' intent, that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow be a final and appealable judgment and Taylor's motion for

5 As

this Court is well aware, I.R.C.P. 54(b) was later amended in 2016 to replace the words
"order or other form of decision" with the word "judgment". The then-existing 2015 applicable
rules are reproduced in the attached Appendix, which Taylor obtained from an archived website
for this Court, https://web.archive.org/web/20150810102419/http://www.isc.idaho.gov:80/ircp
(last visited on August 20, 2017). The rules existing in 2015 apply here, and portions of the thenexisting applicable Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Appellate Rules were copied
verbatim from those archived web pages into a new Word document, which is attached, and
portions highlighted, in the Supplemental Appendix attached to this Brief. (SA. 1-11.)
2

reconsideration, and the three declarations submitted with that motion, were thus timely filed and
served. There are procedural reasons why Taylor's motion for reconsideration was timely, too.
However, even if Justice Eismann's concerns are correct (there is much confusion as to
what constitutes a final judgment under the authorities and Idaho law), Taylor actually timely filed
his notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of the partial consent judgment entered in favor
Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbow, and Taylor previously raised the same issues asserted on
appeal in other prior motions. Thus, this Court still has more than a sufficient record to reverse the
district court on all issues presented on appeal. This Court should still reverse, vacate the
. judgments and fee awards entered, remand this case for trial, and reserve an award of fees to
Taylor.
In addition, this Court should take this opportunity to eliminate all confusion once and for
all through the creation of a bright-line rule that the final judgment in any lawsuit should include
all parties to an action (even if they were dismissed earlier through partial judgments).
II.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL IDSTORY

On October 1, 2009, Taylor filed his complaint asserting numerous claims against
numerous parties-Riley, HTEH, Eberle Berlin and Turnbow-thereby implicating I.R.C.P.
54(b)'s requirements regarding partial final judgments or one final judgment. (R. 25-50.)
On June 3, 2010, the district court entered its first partial judgment dismissing Taylor's
complaint against HTEH. (R. 1736-37 (SA. 12-13).) On August 27, 2014, this Court reversed the
district court as to the negligence claim against Riley based on the transaction being the same for
purpose ofresjudicata. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323,336 P.3d 256 (2014) ("Riley I").
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On February 20, 2015, the district court denied Riley and HTEH's motion to certify their
respective judgments as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). (R. 5037-39 (SA. 14-16).) Instead, on February
20, 2015, the district court entered the first partial judgment in favor of Riley. (R. 5040-41 (SA.
17-18).) The HTEH judgment remained unchanged. (R. 1736-37 (SA. 12-13).)
On July 8, 2015 (after fees and costs were awarded, R. 5816-25), the district court entered
the two second partial judgments in favor of Riley ($239,265.25) and Hawley Troxell
($25,029.00), respectively. (R. 5830-33 (SA. 19-22).)
On August 27, 2015, Taylor mediated with Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. (R.
6299.) That mediation was successful. 6 On September 11, 2015, Taylor, Eberle Berlin and the
Estate of Turnbow entered into a Stipulation to dismiss Taylor's claims against them with
prejudice and without an award of fees or costs to either party. (R. 6305-09 (SA. 23-27).) Riley
and HTEH were not parties to that Stipulation or the settlement. (Id.) On September 11, 2015, the
district court entered the order dismissing Taylor's claims against Eberle Berlin and the Estate of
Turnbow with prejudice. (R. 6310-11 (SA. 28-29).)
On September 18, 2015 at 11:32 AM, the district court's clerk emailed all counsel to this
lawsuit (including counsel for Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow) advising them that final
judgments were needed:
Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and judgment [for Eberle Berlin and
the Estate of Turnbow] to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an
amended judgment and Rule 54(b) certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell.
6

Riley and HTEH refused to attend the mediation, despite requests from Taylor's counsel.

4

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.
(Aug. p. 7 (SA. 52).) Later, at 3:06 PM on that same day (after the district court's clarifying email),
the district court entered the partial consent judgment in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of
Turnbow, which was the product of the Stipulation only between Taylor and them. (R. 6305-09
(SA. 23-27), 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) That partial judgment was nearly identical in form to two other
partial judgments previously filed in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell. (R. 1736-37 9SA 12-13),
5037-39 (SA 17-18).) None of these three partial judgments standing alone, or collectively,
complied with the clear language ofl.R.C.P. 54(a) and (b). (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).)
On September 19, 2017, Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk stating: "I will
reach out to Keely and Loren to see if we can all agree on the form of the final judgment as to all
parties and then get something to the judge." (Aug. p. 8 (SA. 53).) Shortly thereafter, Taylor's
counsel then emailed Loren Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths (opposing counsel) stating:
I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's signature. I think that
the judgment would simply combine what is [in] the judgment that was recently
submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment[s] previously entered for
HTEH and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do
you both think?"
(Aug. p. 9 (SA. 54).)
On September 21, 2015, Riley and HTEH' s counsel, Loren Ipsen, emailed Taylor's counsel
back (and carbon copied other counsel) stating:
Thanks for your offer, but it appears from Kathy Pataro's email that the Court has
already signed the proposed order and judgment, which I assume relate to the
Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin. Therefore, I think it would be simpler for us just
to submit final judgments for Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley as suggested by the
Court.
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(Aug. p. 10 (SA. 55).) Later that same day (September 21, 2015), Riley and HTEH's counsel had
his assistant email the district court's clerk with two proposed "Amended Final Judgment[s]", with
each of them containing an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. (Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).) On the next day
(September 22, 2015), Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk advising her that the
proposed "Amended Final Judgment[ s]" were not approved by him and that "the parties did not
work together to approve the judgments." (Aug. p. 18 (SA. 63).) Taylor's counsel did not object
to those judgments because he believed that the district court could either certify partial judgments
as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b) or enter one consolidated judgment for all of the parties and all of the
claims, i.e., a final judgment that included Riley, HTEH, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow.
(Aug. p. 2-3, 9 (SA. 47-48, 54).)
On October 9, 2015, the district court entered the two "Final Amended Judgment[s]" with
I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificates, in the identical form prepared and submitted by Riley and HTEH's
counsel. (R. 6316-19 (SA. 33-38); Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).)
On October 23, 2015, Taylor timely filed and served his motion for reconsideration and
submitted the Declarations of Professor Richard McDermott, Reed Taylor and Roderick Bond in
support of that motion. (R. 6322-79 (A. 123-56) (the Appendix attached to the Appellant's Brief
contained the declarations only).)
On October 29, 2015, Taylor timely filed his notice of appeal, which was later amended
two more times. (R. 6406-31, 6542-6571, 6735-59 .) If this Court agrees with Justice Eismann,
then Taylor's notice of appeal was still timely filed within 42 days of the partial judgment entered
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in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).)
On March 3, 2016 (after denying reconsideration and awarding more fees, R. 6485-86,
6726-27), the district court entered two Second Amended Judgments for Riley ($243,015.25) and
HTEH ($28,779.00), respectively. (R. 6724-25 (SA 41-42), 6728-29 (SA 39-40.)
From the time before the partial consent judgment was entered in favor of Eberle Berlin
and the Estate of Turnbow (because they settled with Taylor) through and up until the time of oral
argument for this appeal on August 17, 2017, the district court and all counsel all proceeded in a
manner consistent with the understanding that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final and appealable judgment. (Aug. p. 1-18
(SA. 51-68); Resp'ts' Br. at 1-59.)
On August 17, 2017, oral argument was held on this appeal and, after Taylor's oral request,
this Court graciously agreed to allow Taylor to file a Supplemental Brief.7 (8/17/17 Order.) On
August 21, 2017, Taylor filed a Motion to Augment the Record (cited herein as "Aug. p.") to
address the issues raised by Justice Eismann. (SA. 46-63.) This Supplemental Brief followed.

III. SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.
Whether this Court can raise, sua sponte for the first time on appeal, the issue of
subjection matter jurisdiction pertaining to the timeliness of Taylor's motion for reconsideration.
2.
Whether, in this multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit, the partial consent judgment
entered in favor of two of the four defendants, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (after those
parties settled with Taylor), was a non-final partial judgment or a final and appealable judgment.

The undersigned counsel greatly appreciates this Court's willingness to allow him to file
this Supplemental Appellant's Brief and he apologizes for the length of this Brief.
7

7

3.
Whether the district court, and the parties, intended that the partial consent
judgment entered in favor Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final and appealable
judgment.
4.
Whether Riley and HTEH may object or assign error to the entry of the Final
Amended Judgments when they were the ones who invited any errors when they prepared and
submitted the Final Amended Judgments to the district court and thus any error associated with
the entry of those I.R.C.P. 54(b) judgments was harmless and/or invited error.
5.
Whether the jurisdictional issue regarding the timeliness of Taylor's motion for
reconsideration is even implicated because Taylor was not, and could not, seek to amend or reverse
the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow and Riley
and HTEH never objected to any alleged untimeliness and invited any error.
6.
Assuming this Court holds that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment, whether Taylor's appeal was timely.

7.
Assuming this Court holds that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment, whether this Court can still reverse
on all of the issues raised on appeal because Taylor previously raised all of the issues on appeal
and those issues are all supported by evidence that was already in the record prior to the last motion
for reconsideration.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Standards of Review.

"The same rules of interpretation apply [to a judgment] as in ascertaining the meaning of
any other writing." Evans v. City of American Falls, 52 Idaho 7, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932) If this
Court "finds [a] judgment ambiguous, it may refer to the circumstances surrounding the making
of the judgment in attempting to interpret it." Lester v. Lester, 104 Idaho 244, 245, 658 P.2d 915,
916 (1983); see also Evans, 11 P.2d at 367 ("In applying a judgment, 'if the language be in any
degree uncertain, we may properly refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order
or judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it was entered."). When determining issues
around the sufficiency of the form of a final judgment or appealable order, this Court has
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considered other Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Rules. Cf Spokane Structures, Inc. v.
Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619-21, 226 P.3d 1263, 1266-68 (2010); Camp v. East Fork
Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 866-68, 55 P.3d 304, 320-22 (2002).
This Court has, "in the past, applied rules of statutory construction in the interpretation of
our rules of civil procedure. In matters of construction, this Court prefers an interpretation that
gives meaning to every word, clause, and sentence." Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145
Idaho 892,900, 188 P.3d 834, 842 (2008).
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. Such
intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Statutory
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and this language should
be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory
construction. This is because [t]he asserted purpose for enacting the legislation
cannot modify its plain meaning.
Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152, 345 P.3d 207,211 (2015)
(citation omitted). However, there are two additional caveats when this Court interprets the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. First,
'[t]he interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of law over
which this Court exercises free review.' Harrison v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of
Idaho State Bd. ofMed., 145 Idaho 179, 181, 177 P.3d 393,395 (2008). The Idaho
Rules ofCivil Procedure 'shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.' I.R.C.P. 1(a).
Athay v. Rich County, 153 Idaho 815,823,291 P.3d 1014, 1022 (2012) (emphasis added). Second,
"consistent with the mandate ofl.R.C.P. l(a), this Court will construe the provisions of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure liberally in order to resolve cases on their merits instead of on
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technicalities." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,247, 178 P.3d
606, 612 (2008) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

B. This Court May, Sua Sponte, Raise the Jurisdictional Issue Relating to the Timeliness
of Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration.
For the first time on appeal at the time of oral argument, Justice Eismann raised the
jurisdictional issue of whether Taylor's last motion for reconsideration was untimely. Taylor
concedes that Justice Eismann is correct that the issue can be raised by this Court anytime.
"Although neither party challenge[d] [the district court's] decision regarding jurisdiction
on appeal, this Court can consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte." Williams v.

Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 518, 260 P.3d 1186, 1189 (2011) (citation omitted).
Jurisdictional matters include whether a motion for reconsideration was timely. Cf Wicke/ v.

Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532, 536-37, 363 P.3d 854, 858-59 (2015).
Thus, this Court may address sua sponte for the first time on appeal the jurisdictional issue
relating to the timeliness of Taylor's motion for reconsideration, and the three declarations
submitted in support of that motion. (R. 6316-21 (SA 33-38), 6322-79 (A. 123-56) (the Appendix
attached to the Appellant's Brief only contains the three declarations).) However, in order to
address the jurisdictional issue, this Court must first determine whether the partial consent
judgment entered only in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow on September 18, 2015
was a final judgment or whether the Amended Final Judgments entered in favor of Hawley Troxell
and Riley on October 9, 2015 were the final judgments for purposes of this appeal and Taylor's
motion for reconsideration (as the parties and district court believed).
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Taylor maintains that the partial consent judgment entered for Eberle Berlin and the Estate
of Turnbow (SA. 33-35) was simply one of many non-final partial judgments entered in this multiparty and multi-claim lawsuit (SA. 12-13, 17-22, 30-32) and that the Final Amended Judgments,
certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) (SA. 3) entered in favor of Riley and HTEH are the
two final and appealable judgments for this appeal. (SA 33-38.) If this Court agrees with any of
the arguments asserted by Taylor in Section C below (Taylor acknowledges that the issue has been
addressed in many different fact patterns-all distinguishable from the facts here), then Taylor's
motion for reconsideration and the three declarations submitted in support of that motion were
timely filed and served. If this Court disagrees, then Taylor addresses those contingent issues in
Section D below. Taylor will now first address each argument in tum.

C. The Amended Final Judgments Entered in Favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell Are the
Final Judgments for Purposes of this Appeal and Taylor's Motion for
Reconsideration-Not the Interlocutory Partial Consent Judgment Entered in Favor
of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow-and This Court Should Liberally
Construe the Rules to Resolve the Issue in Taylor's Favor to Ensure a Just
Determination of this Appeal and to Ensure that This Appeal Is Decided on the Merits
Instead of on a Technicality.
At oral argument, Justice Eismann suggested that the partial consent judgment entered in
favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow on September 18, 2015 (SA. 30-32) was a final
and appealable judgment and, therefore, Taylor's motion for reconsideration, and the three
additional declarations submitted with that motion, are not properly before this Court because they
were untimely filed and served on October 23, 2015 (although they were timely within 14 days of
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the Final Amended Judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH on October 9, 2015). 8 (R. 632279 (A. 123-56).) While Taylor appreciates the confusion that has arisen over the years regarding
what constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal, Taylor maintains that his motion for
reconsideration and the three declarations submitted with that motion were timely filed and served
for the following reasons.
1. Taylor Maintains that the Plain, Obvious, and Rational Interpretation of Every

Applicable Word, Clause and Sentence in I.R.C.P. 54(b) Dictates One Conclusion
Based on the Facts and Circumstances Here--that the Partial Consent Judgment
Entered in Favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow Was Not a Final
Judgment-Which Is Also the Result this Court's Mandate to Interpret the Rules
Liberally and Justly in Favor of Taylor So that this Appeal Is Resolved on the Merits
Rather than on a Technicality.
While Taylor concedes that there are numerous conflicting authorities (all with fact
patterns distinguishable to the facts present here),9 Taylor maintains that the only appealable
judgments in this multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit, R. 25-50, were the two Final Amended
Judgments, which were certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) and entered in favor of Riley
and HTEH on October 9, 2015. (SA 33-38.) The plain, rational and obvious interpretation of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Appellate Rules, in the required manner required to do

8 "[A] motion for reconsideration is made when it is served, not when it is filed." Fagen,
Inc. v. Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628,633,364 P.3d 1193, 1098 (2016).
9 See, e.g., Camp, 137 Idaho at 867-68, 55 P.3d at 321-22 (in an action between a single
plaintiff and a single defendant, stating the general rule that "[a]s a general rule, a final judgment
is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy,
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties."). In that case, the lawsuit only
involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant and a final judgment was later entered after the
district court granted the motion for involuntary dismissal (though the language contained in the
final judgment is unclear). 137 Idaho at 855,868, 55 P.3d at 309,322. Here, this lawsuit involves
multiple parties and multiple claims, and the district court properly entered two final and
appealable (and executable) judgments in favor of Riley and HTEH. (R. 25-50; SA. 33-35.)
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justice and to determine this appeal on the merits instead of on technicalities based on the facts
and circumstances of this case, dictate that this is the correct result.
Here, the clear and plain meaning ofl.R.C.P. 54 dictates that a partial judgment entered in
favor of two of the four defendants in this lawsuit was not a final judgment. Significantly, this
multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit implicates I.R.C.P. 54(b), which is controlling and supports
Taylor's position that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow
was not a final and appealablejudgment. (R. 25-50, 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).)
The pertinent portion ofl.R.C.P. 54(a) provides:

A iudgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection
(b)(l) of this rule or iudgment has been entered on all claims for relief. except
costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.
I.R.C.P. 54(a) (2015) (emphasis added) (SA 2). The pertinent portion ofl.R.C.P. 54(b) provides:

When more than one claim for reliefis presented in an action ... or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
the judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adiudicates less than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities ofless than all the parties shall not terminate
the actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subiect to revision at any time before the entry of iudgment
adiudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
I.R.C.P. 54(b) (2015) (emphasis added) (SA. 3). The pertinent portion ofl.R.C.P. 54(c) provides

that "[e]xcept as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final iudgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled ..." I.R.C.P. 54(c)
(2015) (emphasis added) (SA. 4). These principals are further explained in various treatises.
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If the writing corresponds with the definition of a judgment and appears to have
been intended by the court as a determination of the rights of the parties .. .A
requirement that a trial court must denominate its final ruling as a judgment is not
a mere formality; it must be clear from the writing that the document or entry is
being called a judgment by the trial court for purposes of determining when a final
appealable judgment is entered.

46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 64 (2017) (emphasis added).
Here, the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow was not
a final judgment because it "adjudicates less than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of
less than all the parties." I.R.C.P. 54(b). (SA. 30-32). That partial consent judgment
unambiguously only dismissed Taylor's claims against Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow:
Judgment is entered as to all claims against Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, which are dismissed with prejudice.

(R. 6314 (SA. 31).) That judgment was not certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). (R. 631315 (SA. 30-32).) In addition, technically speaking, while the Estate of Turnbow was eventually
substituted in as a defendant (R. 1778-80), there still is no judgment that specifically addresses the
claims assert against Turnbow individually in the complaint. (R. 25-50 (SA. 17-22, 30-42.) In any
event, the district court correctly concluded that partial judgment did not comply with I.R.C.P.
54(a), I.R.C.P. 54(b) or I.R.C.P. 54(c) because it only addressed the claims asserted against two of
the parties, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. I.R.C.P. 54(a)-(c) (2015) (SA. 2-4, 30-32).
The plain, rational, and obvious interpretation of the then-existing I.R.C.P. 54 using every word
and sentence (as applied to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and liberally construed
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to reach a just outcome on the merits and not on a technicality) 10 dictates that there be a single
final judgment that includes the resolution of all parties and all claims in a single judgment 11 or
two partial final judgments certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), irrespective of whether there
were numerous partial judgments previously entered. The district court had the discretion of
entering either form of judgment, but he rightfully elected to enter the two Final Amended
Judgments, which were certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). (SA. 33-38.) The district court did
not err in doing so and those judgments fully comply with I.R.C.P. 54.
2. This Court Should Construe I.R.C.P. 54 Harmoniously with Other Applicable Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Appellate Rules, Keeping in Mind this
Court's Mandate to Interpret the Civil Rules of Procedure Justly and in a Manner
that Ensures that this Court Addresses Taylor's Appeal on the Merits Rather than
on a Technicality.
In addition to the clear, plain and ordinary meaning of I.R.C.P. 54 as discussed in Section
C(l) above, the interpretation of I.R.C.P. 54 with other Rules of Civil Procedure and certain
Appellate Rules also supports the conclusion that the Final Amended Judgments, certified as final
under I.R.C.P. 54(b), were the final and appealable judgments for this appeal-not the partial
consent judgment previously entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow.

(E.g., R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18
(SA 46-63).)Athay, 153 Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022; Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at
247, 178 P.3d at 612.
11 I.R.C.P. 54 uses the singular term ''judgment"-which should be construed liberally in
Taylor's favor on this appeal to ensure a just determination of this appeal and the entire record
submitted on appeal based on the merits rather than on a technicality. Compare Minich v. Gem
State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911,591 P.2d 1078 (1979) (stating that under stator construction
the singulartermjudge includes the plural judges); with Athay, 153 Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022
and Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612.
10
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When construing and interpreting judgments or orders to determine whether they
constituted a final and appealable judgment, this Court has harmonized its interpretation with other
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Appellate Rules. See, e.g., Spokane Structures, Inc., 148 Idaho
at 619-21, 226 P.3d at 1266-68; Camp, 137 Idaho at 866-68, 55 P.3d at 320-22.
In other words, the Rules are to be applied not as a set of isolated precepts but as a
harmonious whole. A single Rule cannot be read in a vacuum; it must be read in
light of the statutory commands of the federal judicial code and of the structure of
the entire Rules of Civil Procedure. The courts in administering the Rules have the
duty of giving full expression to the clear meaning of the words used without one
Rule nullifying another.
35A C.J.S. FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 18 (2017) (foot notes omitted).

Here, the plain, ordinary and clear meaning of other Rules of Civil Procedure and certain
Appellate Rule interpreted harmoniously with I.R.C.P. 54 further supports the conclusion that in a
multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit there must be one final judgment that includes all of the relief
granted or denied as to all of the parties-and any other lawsuit for that matter. 12 Thus, the district
court's two "Final Amended Judgments" entered in favor of Riley and HTEH, certified as final
under I.R.C.P. 54(b), are the only two final and appealable judgments entered in this lawsuit, and
the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow is just that-a nonfinal and non-appealable partial judgment. It would be unjust hyper technically interpret the Rules
of Civil Procedure (including I.R.C.P. 54) and the Appellate Rules against Taylor based on the

12 Unless, of course, a partial judgment is certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b)-this
would conclusively resolve certain claims against certain parties in a multi-party lawsuit, which
would result in the final judgment excluding those parties and/or claims that were certified as final
under I.R.C.P. 54(b). Ironically, that was done here for Riley and HTEH. (SA. 33-38.)
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peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, which would not ensure that this Court reaches the
merits of Taylor's appeal and without disposing of certain issues based on a technicality. (E.g., R.
6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).) Athay,
153 Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022; Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612.
First, "[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P. l(a) (2015) (SA. 1). It would be unjust
and expensive, and result in further delays, to interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure (including
I.R.C.P. 54) liberally against Taylor based on the facts and circumstances here.
Second, the then-applicable I.R.C.P.

l l(a)(2)(B) provided that a motion for

reconsideration may be brought at any time before the filing of a "final judgment" or no later than
fourteen days after the filing of such a judgment. I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) (2015) (SA. 2). Again, it
would be unjust and fair, not to mention a technicality, to disregard Taylor's motion for
reconsideration based on the facts and circumstances. This is particularly true because the district
court's clerk had notified all parties prior to filing the partial consent judgment in favor of Eberle
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow that the district court intended for that judgment not to be a final
one and the Final Amended Judgments that were later filed were prepared and submitted by Riley
and HTEH's counsel. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug.
p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).)
Third, I.R.C.P. 59(e) provided that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be

served not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." I.R.C.P. 59(e) (2015) (SA.
4). Taylor had stipulated only with Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow for the dismissal of
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the claims against him after they settled at mediation. (R. 6299, 6305-09 (SA. 23-27), 6310-11
(SA. 28-29).) Taylor had nothing to appeal with regard to the partial judgment entered in favor of
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (even if it was a final judgment). (Id.) In other words, in
order for I.R.C.P. 59(e) to even be implicated, this required the district court to enter final and
appealable judgments in favor of Riley and HTEH. This is precisely what the district court did.
(SA. 33-38.) This triggered Taylor's rights under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and the deadline under that rule
for filing a motion for reconsideration. I.R.C.P. 59(e); I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B).
Fourth, I.R.C.P. 61 provided that "no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything

done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for ... vacating, modifying, or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
I.R.C.P. 61 (2015) (SA. 4). Again, based on the circumstances of this case, it would be unjust and
a miscarriage of justice to throw out Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the three declarations
submitted in support of that motion on a technicality that has prejudiced no one-indeed, Riley
and HTEH's counsel prepared and submitted the two Final Amended Judgments entered in favor
of Riley and HTEH. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p.
1-18 (SA 46-63).)
Fifth, I.R.C.P. 69(a) provided that the "[p]rocess to enforce an appealable final judgment or

partial judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) for the payment of money, or a court order for
the payment of money, shall be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise; but no writ
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of execution may issue on a partial judgment which is not certified as final under Rule 54(b)."
I.R.C.P. 69(a) (2015) (SA. 4). The clear and plain reading of this rule states that a party may not

execute upon a partial judgment that is not certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). This means that
the prior two non-final judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH could not be executed upon
because they were never certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). (R. 5830-33 (SA. 19-22).) In
addition, by the clear terms of the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and
the Estate of Turnbow that judgment was not a final one or certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(b). (SA. 30-32.) The district recognized these problems, which is precisely why it took the
position that the prior two non-final partial judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH needed
to be certified as final so that Taylor could appeal and Riley and HTEH could execute. (R. 631621 (SA. 33-38).)
Sixth, I.A.R. 4 provided that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an appealable judgment ... may

appeal such decision to the Idaho Supreme Court as provided under these rules." I.A.R. 4 (2015)
(SA. 5). Taylor was not aggrieved by the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin
and the Estate of Turnbow as a result of his settlement with them at mediation. (R. 6299, 6305-09
(SA. 23-27), 6310-11 (SA. 28-29).) See, e.g., State ex rel Moore v. Howell, 111 Idaho 963, 965,
729 P.2d 438, 440 (1986) (This Court has "defined a 'party aggrieved' as any party injuriously
affected by the iudgment.") (emphasis added); Saint Michael's Monastery v. Steele, 30 Idaho
609, 167 P. 349 (l 917) ("A party considering himself aggrieved by the final judgment of a district
court has his plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law by appeal to this court ... "). Riley and
HTEH were not parties to the stipulation and, in fact, they refused to participate in mediation. (R.
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6305-09 (SA. 23-27).) Indeed, by the terms of the Stipulation, Taylor could not appeal that partial
judgment and he certainly had not right to drag Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow back into
an appeal. Once again, the district court recognized that Taylor was not "aggrieved" by the partial
consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow, which is, once
again, why the district court took action to ensure that there were final and appealable judgments
entered in favor of Riley and HTEH. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA
33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).)
Seventh, I.A.R. 11 provided that "[a]n appeal may be taken from ... [t]inal judgments, as

defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." I.A.R. ll(a)(2) (2015) (SA. 5).) That
Rule does not state "as defined by other authorities"-it states as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a). That
Rule states judgment in the singular form. I.A.R. ll(a)(2). In addition, I.A.R. ll(a)(3) provides
that "[a]n appeal may be taken from ... O]udgments made pursuant to a partial judgment certified
by the trial court to be final as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P." I.A.R. ll(a)(3). The partial
consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow did not technically
comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a) or I.R.C.P. 54(b) because "[a] judgment is final if either it has been
certified as final pursuant to subsection (b )(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all
claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action." (R. 631315 (SA. 30-32).) That judgment simply involved two of the at least four parties and it was not
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certified as final. (Id.) While this Court has rendered a number of decisions that state otherwise, 13
Taylor is maintaining that this Court should liberally construe the rules in his favor to ensure a just
appeal and that this Court decides this appeal on the merits rather than a technicality. Athay, 153
Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022; Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612.

Finally, after interpreting and construing the rules stated above with the interpretation of
I.R.C.P. 54 articulated in Section C( 1) above and considering the facts and circumstances in this
case (which are distinguishable from any other prior decision from this Court), this Court should,
"consistent with the mandate of l.R.C.P. l(a) .. .construe the provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure liberally in order to resolve cases on their merits instead ofon technicalities." Seiniger

Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612.

3. The Partial Consent Judgment Entered in Favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of
Turnbow Was Ambiguous Because this Lawsuit Involved Five Different Parties and
Multiple Claims Against Each Party and, Thus, This Court Should Look at the
Entire Record (including the Augmented Record) to Ascertain the Intent of the
District Court and the Parties-Which Unequivocally Demonstrates that the
District Court and All of the Parties Never Intended that the Partial Judgment
Entered in Favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow Be a Final Judgment.
This Court should look to the record to determine the district court's intent because there
is no doubt that this Court must look beyond the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow to ascertain the district court's intent when it entered that partial

See, e.g., Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 99, 279
P.3d 80, 85 (2012); Harrison v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201, 205,
233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010); Skaggs v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 114, 106 P
.3d 440 (2005); Camp, 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304; Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d
362 (1999); Hunting v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,637,931 P .2d 628,631
(1997). Taylor respectfully asserts that a bright-line rule should be adopted. (See Section E.)
13
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consentjudgment. (Compare R. 25-50 with R. 6313-15 (SA 30-32).)
"The same rules of interpretation apply [to a judgment] as in ascertaining the meaning of
any other writing." Evans, 11 P.2d at 367. If this Court "finds [a] judgment ambiguous, it may
refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment in attempting to interpret it."
Lester, 104 Idaho at 245, 658 P.2d at 916. Simply put,

In applying a judgment, 'if the language be in any degree uncertain, we may
properly refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order or
judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it was entered.'
Evans, 11 P.2d at 367.

A judgment must be construed in light of the situation of the court, what was before
it, and the accompanying circumstances ... An ambiguity in a judgment exists when
language can be reasonably construed as having at least two alternative meanings.
If there is uncertainty and ambiguity in a judgment, the reviewing court must
construe it so as to express the intent of the trial judge. Ifajudgment is ambiguous,
a reviewing court determines its meaning by examining the entire judgment, and
particular words cannot be isolated from the judgment but must be
considered ... When interpreting a judgment, effect must be given to that which is
clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.
46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS§ 74 (2017) (foot notes omitted).

In the construction of an ambiguous judgment, the reviewing court may look to
extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguity which includes looking at the entire
record. Accordingly, the interpretation of a judgment may involve the
circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. An appellate court may
look at the entire record, including, but not limited to, the complaint, findings, and
evidence to ascertain the judgment's meaning and effect. A court may also consider
the pleadings, the subject matter of the suit, the reasons for the judgment, and other
matters ofrecord.
46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 76 (2017).
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Here, there is no doubt that the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the
Estate of Turnbow is ambiguous because it only resolves Taylor's claims against two of the
defendants. (R. 25-50, 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) Thus, this Court should look to the record (including
the augmented record (SA. 46-63)) to ascertain the meaning of that partial judgment and the district
court's intent at the time that judgment was entered. It was uniformly agreed and understood by
the district court and all parties that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin
and the Estate of Turnbow was not intended to be a final and appealable judgment. (R. 6313-15
(SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).)
More specifically, on September 18, 2015 at 11:32 AM, the district court's clerk emailed
all counsel to this lawsuit (including counsel for Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow) advising
them that final judgments were needed:
Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and judgment [for Eberle Berlin and
the Estate of Turnbow] to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an
amended judgment and Rule 54(b) certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell.
Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.
(Aug. p. 7 (SA. 52).) Later, at 3:06 PM on that same day (after the district court's clarifying email),
the district court entered the partial consent judgment in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of
Turnbow, which was the product of the Stipulation only between Taylor and them. 14 (R. 6305-09
(SA. 23-27), 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) That partial judgment was nearly identical in form to two other
partial judgments previously filed in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell. (R. 1736-37 9SA 12-13),

"It is not the signing, but the filing, of the ...judgment that determines the action. If they
are filed ... thejudgment is valid." Greene v. Edgington, 37 Idaho 1,214 P. 751, 752 (1923).
14
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5037-39 (SA 17-18).) None of these three partial judgments standing alone, or collectively,
complied with the clear language ofl.R.C.P. 54(a) and (b). (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).)
On September 19, 2017, Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk stating: "I will
reach out to Keely and Loren to see ifwe can all agree on the form of the final judgment as to all
parties and then get something to the judge." (Aug. p. 8 (SA. 53).) Shortly thereafter, Taylor's
counsel then emailed Loren Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths (opposing counsel) stating:
I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's signature. I think that
the judgment would simply combine what is [in] the judgment that was recently
submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment[s] previously entered for
HTEH and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do
you both think?"
(Aug. p. 9 (SA. 54).)
On September 21, 2015, Riley and HTEH's counsel, Loren Ipsen, emailed Taylor's counsel
back (and carbon copied other counsel) stating:
Thanks for your offer, but it appears from Kathy Pataro's email that the Court has
already signed the proposed order and judgment, which I assume relate to the
Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin. Therefore, I think it would be simpler for us just
to submit final judgments for Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley as suggested by the
Court.
(Aug. p. 10 (SA. 55).) Later that same day (September 21, 2015), Riley and HTEH's counsel had
his assistant email the district court's clerk with two proposed "Amended Final Judgment[s]", with
each of them containing an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. (Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).) On the next day
(September 22, 2015), Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk advising her that the
proposed "Amended Final Judgment[ s]" were not approved by him and that "the parties did not
work together to approve the judgments." (Aug. p. 18 (SA. 63).) Taylor's counsel did not object
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to those judgments because he believed that the district court could either certify partial judgments
as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b) or enter one consolidated judgment for all of the parties and all of the
claims, i.e., a final judgment that included Riley, HTEH, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow.
(Aug. p. 2-3, 9 (SA. 47-48, 54).)
On October 9, 2015, the district court entered the two "Final Amended Judgment[s]" with
I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificates, in the identical form prepared and submitted by Riley and HTEH's
counsel. (R. 6316-19 (SA. 33-38); Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).)
Accordingly, based on the facts and circumstances stated above, there is no doubt that the
district court and the parties believed and proceeded in a manner consistent with the understanding
that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was
not a final and appealable judgment. To hold otherwise would be manifestly unjust and would
further result in Taylor's appeal not being fully decided on the merits, but instead being decided
on a technicality.
However, even if the record is not augmented with recently filed declaration from the
undersigned counsel (SA. 46-63), there is still sufficient information to ascertain the intent of the
district court and the parties from the judgments entered (in particular the later Final Amended
Judgments for HTEH and Riley) and the failure of anyone to object or proceed in any manner other
than under the belief that the only final and appealable judgments were the two entered in favor of
Riley and HTEH. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35), 6322-6404,
6432-71; 12/9/15 Tr., p. 54-97.) There is no doubt that the district court intended that those two
judgments would be the final ones. (R. 6316-21 (SA. 33-38).) There is no reason why the district
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court would have entered, on its own accord, two Final Amended Judgments if he had intended
that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow be
the final and appealable judgment.
4. At Most, the District Court's Entry of the Two Final Amended Judgments in Favor
of Riley and HTEH and the Prior Partial Judgment in Favor of Eberle Berlin and
the Estate of Tunbow and Any Timeliness Issues Pertaining to Taylor's Motion for
Reconsideration Was Harmless Error and Riley and HTEH Invited Any Error and
Waived any Errors for Not Objecting before the District Court.

Riley and HTEH have not been prejudiced by any act of the district court or Taylor, they
never objected to any issue regarding the entry of the Final Amended Judgments and the
proceedings relating to Taylor's motion for reconsideration. Simply put, this Court should
disregard those issues entirely, and HTEH and Riley are responsible for inviting any errors
no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court
or by any of the parties is ground for ... vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
I.R.C.P. 61 (2015) (SA. 4).

Here, Riley and HTEH participated and invited any errors in the proceedings to enter the
judgments. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA
46-63).) Indeed, Riley and HTEH were the ones who prepared and submitted the two Final
Amended Judgments that the district court ultimately signed and entered. (Id.) Moreover, Riley
and HTEH never complained or objected to the manner in which the district court was proceeding
and the method that he later entered the Final Amended Judgments. (Id.)
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Significantly, Taylor's notice of appeal was timely filed and served within 42 days of the
date of the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow
and the two Final Amended Judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH. (R. 63113-14 (SA.
30-32), 6316-21 (SA. 33-38), 6406-31.) Thus, there is no prejudice in that regard.
And since Taylor's motion for reconsideration was not submitted to amend the partial
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow, then there is no prejudice
as to any alleged untimeliness of Taylor's motion for reconsideration, so there is no prejudice in
that regard either. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35), 6322-6404,
6432-71; 12/9/15 Tr., p. 54-97; Resp'ts' Br. at 1-59.)
Thus, Riley and HTEH have not been prejudiced by any act of the district court and they, in
fact, invited any error in the proceeding relative to the entry of the various judgments and the
timing of Taylor's motion for reconsideration. I.R.C.P. 61. Put another way, Riley and HTEH are
"barred under the invited error doctrine from raising this as an error on appeal." Taylor v.

McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,832,243 P.3d 642,648 (2010).
5. Since Taylor Was Not Moving to Reconsider the Partial Judgment Entered in Favor
of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (Nor Could He), His Motion for
Reconsideration Is Not a Jurisdictional Issue Because It Must Be Presumed that
Judge Greenwood Would Have Enlarged Time.
Even assuming that Taylor's motion for reconsideration was untimely because this Court's
holds that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow
was, in fact, a final and appealable judgment. Taylor was not appealing or seeking any relief from
that partial judgment (nor could he) so I.R.C.P. 59(a) has no application here. Moreover, HTEH
and Riley invited any error or irregularity in terms of the district court's entry of the Final Amended
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Judgments, certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), and they waived any objection to the timeliness
of Taylor's motion for reconsideration by not raising the issue before the district court.
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14)
days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order
of the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen
(14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no motion for
reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion filed under
Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) (2015) (SA. 2).
The record fails to disclose that an objection to the timeliness of Glen's claim was
made before the magistrate. Rather, the question of timeliness appears to have been
raised for the first time on appeal. In general, appellate courts in Idaho will not
consider issues newly raised. E.g., Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197, 668 P.2d 73
(1983); Green v. Young, 102 Idaho 735, 639 P.2d 433 (1981). Although an
exception to this rule applies to jurisdictional issues, we do not deem the
purportedly late filing to represent a jurisdictional defect. Even if Rules 54(d)( 5)
and 54(e)(5) were applicable, the magistrate would have been authorized, upon a
showing of good cause, to extend the time for filing memoranda of costs and
attorney fees. Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d
1067 (1983).
Matter of Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho 350,353, 707 P.2d 461,464 (Ct. App. 1985).

Here, even assuming that the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the
Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment, Taylor's motion for reconsideration was not seeking to
amend that judgment and thus I.R.C.P. 59(a) was not implicated and there are no jurisdictional
issues. Moreover, Riley and HTEH never objected to the alleged untimeliness of Taylor's motion
for reconsideration. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35), 63226404, 6432-71; 12/9/15 Tr., p. 54-97; Resp'ts' Br. at 1-59.) Indeed, Riley and HTEH proceeded in
the same manner as Taylor in terms of believing that the partial consent judgment entered in favor
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of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final and appealable judgment, and Riley
and HTEH invited any errors associated with the entry of the Final Amended Judgments and the
timing of Taylor's subsequent motion for reconsideration because they prepared and submitted
those Final Amended Judgments to the district court for entry, which it did. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 3032), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).)
This Court recently held that "the district court could have granted permission to serve
untimely documents in support of the motion for reconsideration had Lava Beds and Exergy
Development requested an extension of time ... but Lava Beds and Exergy Development did not do
so." Fagen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 634, 364 P.3d at 1199. This same rationale applies here to Taylor's
motion for reconsideration and the declarations submitted in support of that motion.
Thus, because the district court could have enlarged time for Taylor to file his motion for
reconsideration and the declarations submitted with that motion. I.R.C.P. 6(b) (2015) (SA. 1).
Because this Court should assume that motion would have been granted based on the facts and
circumstances, which favorably resolves any alleged jurisdictional issues in Taylor's favor. Matter
of Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho at 353, 707 P.2d at 464.
D. Even If this Court Holds that the Partial Consent Judgment Entered in Favor of Eberle
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow Was a Final and Appealable Judgment and Thus
Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration and the Three Declarations Submitted With that
Motion Are Not Properly Before this Court, Taylor's Notice of Appeal Was Still Timely
and All of the Issues on Appeal Were Previously Asserted before the District Court and
Are Supported by Other Evidence in the Record.

If this Court agrees that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and
the Estate of Turnbow was a final and appealable judgment, then Taylor's notice of appeal was
still timely filed within 42 days of that judgment, and his appeal automatically entitles him to
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appeal other judgments and orders. (R. 63113-14 (SA. 30-32), 6406-31.) I.A.R. 11 (2015); I.A.R.
14(a) (2015); I.A.R. 17(c)(l) (2015) (SA. 5-8).

While Taylor cited primarily to the evidence submitted in support of reconsideration for
his appeal, all of his arguments were asserted in other motions and are supported in large part by
other evidence in the record. As such, in an abundance of caution, Taylor will provide those
additional citations to the record for each issue on appeal. Before addressing specific issues, even
without the record developed on Taylor's motion for reconsideration, the rest of the previously
developed record contained significant arguments, testimony, exhibits and at least one Affidavit
from Richard T. McDermott-all of which support reversal on all issues asserted on appeal without
the need of the motion for reconsideration (including the efforts to obtain Riley's concealed facts).
(E.g., R. 25-50, 66, 86, 111, 114-1360, 945-46, 1463-1544, 1573-81, 1632-62, 1703-35, 1798,

1891-2433, 2444-2515, 253-55, 2575-90, 2610-35, 2663-75, 2688-3388, 3484-3715, 3821-34,
3841-4048, 4054-55, 4109-15, 4217-54, 4284-4314, 4437-4486.)
1. Taylor Asserted Ripeness and that His Claims Were Not Ripe Until After Babbitt.

Taylor maintains that his claims here accrued after his complaint was dismissed in Babbitt.
(Appellant's Br. at 14-17; Errata Re: Appellant's Br. at 2.; E.g., R. 1463-87, 1477-78, 1494-95,
1531-32, 2828-3377, 2478-80, 2493, 4449-53, 4456-57.)
2. Taylor Asserted that His Negligence/Malpractice Claim Against Riley Did Not
Accrue and There Was No Objective Proof of Some Damage and Fraudulent
Concealment.

Taylor maintains that his malpractice/assumed duty claims did not accrue until he had
objected proof of some damage, which was no earlier than Judge Bruide's decision finding the
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SRA illegal and unenforceable on June 17, 2009 and that other claims accrued later based on
fraudulent concealment. (Appellant's Br. at 16-23; Errata Re: Appellant's Br. at 2-3; E.g., R. 146387, 1499-1502, 1501, 1517-19, 2478-80, 2493, 2828-3377.)

3. Taylor Asserted that His Fraud Claims Constituted a New Transaction and They
Were Also Not Ripe Until After Babbitt.
Taylor maintains that his fraud, constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims
were not ripe before Judge Brudie's illegality decision, were based on new facts after Babbitt, and
that he could not have discovered the fraud any earlier than when Riley finally came clean in 2012.
(Appellant's Br. at 26-31; E.g., R. 1463-87, 1531-32, 1720, 2828-3377, 4444-49, 4455-56.)

4. Taylor Asserted that His Fraud Claims Here Are Different Because the Fraud
Argument that He Made in Taylor v. AL4 Was a Defense to the Illegality Doctrine.
Taylor maintains that res judicata or collateral estoppel does not apply to his fraud claims
because his assertion of fraud in Taylor v. AJA was solely a defense to the illegality doctrine and
he could not have asserted fraud against Riley in that lawsuit. (E.g., 813-22, 1463-87, 1482-83,
1497-99, 1720, 2828-3377, 4455-59.)

5. Taylor Asserted that His Fraud Claims Here Are Not Barred by Collateral Estoppel
Because He Did Not Have a Fair Opportunity to Litigate His Fraud Claim in Taylor
v.AL4.
Taylor maintains that his fraud claims here are not barred by collateral estoppel because he
did not have a fair opportunity to litigate those claims and was procedurally prevented from
deposing Riley. (Appellant's Br. at 32-41; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 1497-99, 1720, 2828-3377,
4457-59.)
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6. Taylor Asserted that Riley Owed Him Fiduciary Duties Through the Opinion Letter
and/or a Special Relationship of Trust and Confidence.
Taylor maintains that Riley owed him fiduciary duties through the opinion letter and/or his
historical relationship of trust and confidence. (Appellant's Br. at 27, 45-48; Errata re: Appellant's
Br. at 3-4; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 2452-58.)

7. Taylor Asserted that this Court Should Expand Duffin to Include the Tort of
Negligent Misrepresentations Against Attorneys.
Taylor maintains that this Court should extend negligent misrepresentation claims to be
asserted against attorneys who provide opinion letters and expand that claim to include omissions
of fact. (Appellant's Br. at 41-45; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 1505-07, 1519-22, 1534-35.)

8. Taylor Asserted that HTEH Was Liable for the Damages Caused by Riley During
the Time that Riley Was a Partner at HTEH.
Taylor maintains that HTEH is liable for damages attributable to acts and/or omissions from
Riley during the time that he was a partner at HTEH. (Appellant's Br. at 48-49; Errata re:
Appellant's Br. at 4; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 1543, 3378-87.)

9. Taylor Asserted that Riley's Opinions Were Misleading and that He Omitted the
Reasoning from His Opinion Letter.
Taylor maintains that Riley's opinions were misleading because he omitted the required
reasoning and disclosures from his opinion letter. (See generally Appellant's Br. at 15-48; E.g., R.
813-22, 1463-87, 1720, 2446-58, 2828-3377, 3378-87.)
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E. This Court Should Adopt a Bright-Line Rule that there Must Be Only One Final
Judgment (Subject to I.R.C.P. 54(b)) and that the Final Judgment Must Include All
Parties to the Action and Combine Any Prior Partial Judgments into the Final
Judgment.
Based on the arguments and authorities addressed in Section C above, Taylor respectfully
suggests to this Court that it should consider adopting a new bright-line rule that all final judgments
must address all of the parties and all of the claims asserted in a lawsuit in one consolidated final
judgment. This would conclusively eliminate any confusion regarding these issues.

F. To the Extent This Court Would Like Additional Oral Argument on Any or All of the
Above Issues, Taylor's Counsel Will Make Himself Promptly Available.
If this Court desires additional oral argument, Taylor's counsel will alter or revise his

schedule to the extent possible to participate in any further oral argument. See generally I.A.R. 37.

V. CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin
and the Estate of Turnbow was a non-final partial consent judgment and that the Final Amended
Judgments, certified a final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), are the final and appealable judgments for this
appeal. In the alternative, this Court should still hold that Taylor's motion for reconsideration was
timely.
If this Court finds that Taylor's motion for reconsideration was not timely, then this Court

can still decide all of the issues on appeal on the merits because he preserved all of the issues for
appeal in prior motions and they are supported by evidence in the record.
Lastly, Taylor respectfully suggest that this Court should consider adopting a new brightline rule with regard to the entry of one final judgment to rectify all confusion regarding the issue.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 2017.

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of August, 2017, I caused to be served
two (for each party) true and correct copies of the foregoing to the following parties:

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile - (208) 384-5844
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement)

Jeffrey A. Thomson
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St., Suite 300
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 384-5844

-
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APPLICABLE RULES AS THEY EXISTED IN 2015 1
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule l(a). Scope of Rules.
These rules govern the procedure and apply uniformly in the district courts and the magistrate's
divisions of the district courts in the state of Idaho in all actions, proceedings and appeals of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, including probate proceedings and
proceedings in which a judge pro tempore is appointed pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative
Rule 4; except that certain proceedings in the magistrate's division involving family law and the
Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act are governed by the Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure as set forth in IRFLP 101 and proceedings in the small claims department are
governed by these rules only as provided by Rule 81. All references in these rules to the court or
district court shall include the magistrate's division, and all references to judges or clerks shall
include magistrates and their clerks and a judge pro tempore appointed pursuant to Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 4, except as referred to in Rules 81, 82 and 83. These rules shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
(Amended March 17, 2006, effective July 1, 2006; amended March 9, 2015, effective July 1,
2015.)

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6(b ). Enlargement.
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or
allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties, by written stipulation, which does
not disturb the orderly dispatch of business or the convenience of the court, filed in the action,
before or after the expiration of the specified period, may enlarge the period, or the court for
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the
period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect; but the time may not be extended for taking any action under rules 50(b ), 52(b), 59(b ),
(d), (e ), and 60(b) except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(l). General Rules of Pleading - Claims for Relief.
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) if the court be of limited jurisdiction, a short and
plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded.
1 The

applicable rules in this Appendix were copied and pasted verbatim from this Court archived website on August
10, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150810 I 024 l 9/http://www.isc.idaho.gov:80/ircp (last visited on August 20,
2017). This website is known as the WayBack Machine and it archives numerous websites at various times over many
years.
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule ll(a)(2). Successive Applications for Orders or Writs Motions for Reconsideration.
(A) Successive Applications. In any action, if an application by any party to the judge of a court
for the issuance of an order or writ is denied in whole or in part by such judge, neither the party
nor the party's attorney shall make any subsequent application to any other judge except by
appeal to a higher court; provided that a second application may be made for a constitutional writ
after a disclosure of the first application has been made to the second judge. Any writ or order
obtained in violation of this section shall be immediately vacated by the judge issuing the same
upon discovery of the prior application to another judge, and the party and the attorney shall be
subject to such costs and sanctions as the court may determine in its discretion. Nothing in this
rule shall prevent a party or the attorney from renewing a motion or an application to the same
judge, or a newly appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally
denied; but this provision and this rule shall not create the right to file a motion for
reconsideration except as provided in subsection (B) of this rule. Nothing in this rule shall
prevent a party or an attorney from renewing a motion or an application for a constitutional writ
to the same judge, or a newly appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was
originally denied.
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the
trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen
(14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the
trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen ( 14) days from the
entry of such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial
court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or
60(b).
(Adopted June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987; amended March 20, 1991, effective July 1,
1991.)

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(a). Judgments - Definition - Form.
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled "Judgment" or "Decree".
A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in
the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's
legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it has been
certified as final pursuant to subsection (bX1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all
claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. A
judgment shall begin with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: .. ," and it
shall not contain any other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment can
include any findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or
regulation.
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(Amended March 29, 2010; effective July 1, 2010; amended April 2, 2014; effective July 1,
2014.)

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving
Multiple Parties.

( 1) Certificate of Final Judgment. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of
the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the actions
as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties. If any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such as on a
claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall be offset against each other
and a single judgment for the difference between the entitlements shall be entered in favor of the
party entitled to the larger judgment. In the event the trial court determines that a judgment
should be certified as final under this Rule 54(b), the court shall execute a certificate which shall
immediately follow the court's signature on the judgment and be in substantially the following
form:
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby CERTIFIED,
in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the
above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this _ _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 20_ __

(Signature - District Judge)
(2) Jurisdiction if Appealed After Rule 54(b) Certificate. If a Rule 54(b) Certificate is issued on
a partial judgment and an appeal is filed, the trial court shall lose all jurisdiction over the entire
action, except as provided in Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
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(Amended December 19, 1975, effective January 1, 1976; amended March 31, 1978, effective
July 1, 1978; amended April 11, 1979, effective May 1, 1979; amended March 27, 1989,
effective July 1, 1989.)
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(c). Demand for Judgment.

A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in
the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default,
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e). Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment.

A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after
entry of the judgment.

(Amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.)

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 61. Harmless Error.

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling
or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 69. Execution - In General.

(a) Process to enforce an appealable final judgment or partial judgment certified as final under
Rule 54(b) for the payment of money, or a court order for the payment of money, shall be a writ
of execution, unless the court directs otherwise; but no writ of execution may issue on a partial
judgment which is not certified as final under Rule 54(b). Provided, a writ of execution shall not
issue for an amount other than the face amount of the judgment, and costs and attorney fees
approved by the court, without an affidavit of the party or the party's attorney verifying the
computation of the amount due under the judgment. The clerk may rely upon such an affidavit in
issuing a writ of execution. After service of the writ of execution, the sheriff shall make a return
to the clerk of the court and indicate thereon the amount of the service fees and whether all of
such fees were collected by the sheriff upon the service of the writ of execution. Any balance of
the service fees of the writ of execution not collected by the sheriff shall be added to the
judgment by the clerk as provided in Rule 54( d).
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(b) The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment, and in
proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of
execution shall be in accordance with the statutes of the state ofldaho and as provided in these
rules.
(c) Obtaining Discovery: In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or successor
in interest when that interest appears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, including
the judgment debtor, as provided in these rules and may examine any person, including the
judgment debtor, in the manner provided by the practice of this state.
(Amended January 8, 1976, effective March 1, 1976; am. July 2, 1976, effective October 1,
1976; amended March 23, 1983, effective July 1, 1983; amended June 15, 1987, June 17, 1987,
effective July 1, 1987; amended April 29, 2013, effective July 1, 2013.)
Idaho Appellate Rule 4. Persons Who May Appeal.

Any party aggrieved by an appealable judgment, order or decree, as defined in these rules, of a
district court, the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial Commission may appeal such
decision to the Supreme Court as provided in these rules.
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977.)

Idaho Appellate Rule 11. Appealable Judgments and Orders.
An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following judgments
and orders:

(a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders of a district court in a civil action:
(1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including
judgments of the district court granting or denying peremptory writs of mandate and prohibition.
(2) Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or remanding an appeal.
(3) Judgments made pursuant to a partial judgment certified by the trial court to be fmal as
provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.
(4) Any order or judgment of contempt.
(5) An order granting or refusing a new trial, including such orders which contain a conditional
grant or denial of a new trial subject to additur and remittitur.
(6) An order granting or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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(7) Any order made after final judgment including an order denying a motion to set aside a
default judgment, but excluding an order granting a motion to set aside a default judgment.
(8) Any order appealable under the Uniform Arbitration Act, Title Seven, Chapter 9 of the Idaho
Code.
(9) A district court order designating a person a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 59, in which case the notice of appeal may be filed with either the district
court clerk or the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
(b) Probate Proceedings. From any interlocutory or final judgment or order made after final
judgment of a district court in a probate proceeding, whether original or appellate, which is or
would be appealable from the magistrates division to the district court by statute or these rules.
(c) Criminal Proceedings. From the followingjudgments and orders of the district court in a
criminal action, whether or not the trial court retains jurisdiction:
(1) Final judgments of conviction.
(2) Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or remanding an appeal.
(3) An order granting a motion to dismiss an information or complaint.
(4) Any order or judgment, whenever entered and however denominated, terminating a
criminal action, provided that this provision shall not authorize a new trial in any case where the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy would otherwise prevent a second trial.
(5) Any order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the
objection of the prosecutor.
(6) Any judgment imposing sentence after conviction, except a sentence imposing the death
penalty which shall not be appealable until the death warrant is issued as provided by statute.
(7) An order granting a motion to suppress evidence.
(8) An order granting or denying a motion for new trial.
(9) Any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or the
state.
(10) Decisions by the district court on criminal appeals from a magistrate, either dismissing
the appeal or affirming, reversing or remanding.
( 11) Any order or judgment of contempt.
(d) Administrative Proceedings - Industrial Commission.

SA. -6

( 1) From any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission or from any final decision
or order upon rehearing or reconsideration by the administrative agency.
(2) From any order of the Industrial Commission deciding compensability that the
Commission has determined should be immediately appealable pursuant to Rule 12.4. Any
appeal from the order must be taken within fourteen (14) days from the date file stamped by the
Industrial Commission on the written determination that the order should be immediately
appealable. The appeal shall be expedited as set forth in Rule 12.4. The failure to appeal the
order on compensability pursuant to this subsection shall not preclude consideration of the order
in an appeal taken pursuant to subsection ( 1) of this rule.
(e) Administrative Proceedings - Public Utilities Commission. From any decision or order of the
Public Utilities Commission which is appealable to the Supreme Court by statute.
(f) Administrative Proceedings - Judicial Review of Agency Decisions. From any final decision
or order of the district court on judicial review of an agency decision.

(g) Cross-appeals and additional issues on appeal. - After an appeal has been filed from a
judgment or order specified above in this rule, a timely cross-appeal may be filed from any
interlocutory or final judgment order or decree. If no affirmative relief is sought by way of
reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment, order or decree, an issue may be presented by
the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal.
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1,
1978; amended March 24, 1982, effective July 1, 1982; amended March 30, 1984, effective July
1, 1984; amended March 20, 1985, effective July 1, 1985; amended March 28, 1986, effective
July 1, 1986; amended June 15, 1987; effective November 1, 1987; amended March 20, 1991,
effective July 1, 1991, amended March 9, 1999, effective July 1, 1999; amended January 30,
2001, effective July 1, 2001; amended March 21, 2007, effective July 1, 2007, amended March
29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010; amended November 20, 2012, effective January 1, 2013;
amended June 20, 2013, effective July 1, 2013; amended April 23, 2015, effective July 1, 2015.)

Idaho Appellate Rule 14. Time for Filing Appeals.

All appeals permitted or authorized by these rules, except as provided in Rule 12, shall be taken
and made in the manner and within the time limits as follows:
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right from the district court may

be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42
days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or
order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. The time
for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by the filing of a timely
motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment
in the action (except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or motions
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regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period for all judgments or orders
commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion.
The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action is terminated
by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the judgment which, if granted,
could affect the judgment, order or sentence in the action, in which case the appeal period for the
judgment and sentence commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order
deciding such motion. If, at the time of judgment, the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 19-2601(4), the length of time to file an appeal from the sentence contained in
the criminal judgment shall be enlarged by the length of time between entry of the judgment of
conviction and entry of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on
probation; provided, however, that all other appeals challenging the judgment must be brought
within 42 days of that judgment. Provided, if a criminal judgment imposes the sentence of death,
the time within which to file a notice of appeal does not commence to run until the death warrant
is signed and filed by the court.
(b) Appeals From an Administrative Agency. An appeal as a matter of right from an
administrative agency may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the Public
Utilities Commission or the Industrial Commission within 42 days from the date evidenced by
the filing stamp of the clerk or secretary of the administrative agency on any decision, order or
award appealable as a matter of right. The time for an appeal from such decision, order or award
of the industrial commission is terminated by a timely motion for rehearing or reconsideration of
the decision or order which, if granted, could affect the decision, order or award (except motions
regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period commences to run upon the
date of the filing stamp on the order or decision denying such motion or the decision on
rehearing or reconsideration. The time for an appeal from such decision, order or award of the
public utilities commission begins to run when an application for rehearing is denied, or, if the
application is granted, after the date evidenced by the filing stamp on the decision on rehearing.
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1,
1978; amended April 3, 1981, effective July 1, 1981; amended April 18, 1983, effective July 1,
1983; amended March 30, 1984, effective July 1, 1984; amended March 21, 2007; effective July
1, 2007, amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010; amended March 18, 2011, effective
July 1, 2011.)

Idaho Appellate Rule 17. Notice of Appeal- Contents.
A notice of appeal shall contain substantially the following information:
(a) Title. The title of the action or proceeding.
(b) Court or Agency Title. The title of the court or agency which heard the trial or proceeding
and the name and title of the presiding judge or official.
(c) Case Number. The number assigned to the action or proceeding by the trial court or
administrative agency.
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(d) Parties. The name of the appealing party and the party's attorney and the name of the adverse
party and that party's attorney. An address, phone number and email address must also be given,
except no email address is required for persons appearing prose.
(e) Designation of Appeal.
(1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order Appealed From. The notice of appeal shall designate
the judgment or order appealed from which shall be deemed to include, and present on appeal:
(A) All interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree
appealed from, and
(B) All final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed from for
which the time for appeal has not expired, and
(C) All interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed
from except orders relinquishingjurisdiction after a period of retained jurisdiction or orders
granting probation following a period of retained jurisdiction.
(2) Premature Filing of Notice of Appeal. A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment
or order before formal written entry of such document shall become valid upon the filing and the
placing the stamp of the clerk of the court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling
the notice of appeal.

(t) Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant
from asserting other issues on appeal.
(g) Jurisdictional Statement. A statement as to the basis for the right to appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal.
(h) Transcript. A designation as to whether a transcript is requested, and if requested, whether a
standard transcript, a supplemented transcript, or a partial transcript as defined in Rule 25 is
requested by the appellant. The notice shall also state whether appellant's copy of the transcript
shall be provided in hard copy or electronic format or both. If no election is made within 21 days
of filing the notice of appeal, the appeallant will receive a hard copy of the transcript. If a
supplemented transcript is requested, the request shall specifically identify each of the items of
additional record requested which would otherwise be excluded under Rule 25 (c).
(i) Record. A designation of documents, if any, to be included in the clerk's or agency's record in
addition to those automatically included pursuant to the following Rule 28.

G) Exhibits-Civil Cases. A designation of documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits in a trial or hearing to be copies and sent to the Supreme Court.
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(k) Sealed Record. A statement as to whether an order has been entered sealing all or any part of
the record or transcript.

(1) Certification. A certification of the attorney of the appellant, or affidavit of the appellant
representing himself or herself:
( 1) That service of the notice of appeal has been made upon the reporter of the trial or
proceeding;
(2) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the estimated fees
for preparation of the designated reporter's transcript as required by Rule 24, or that appellant is
exempt from paying such fees because of stated reasons;
(3) That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record have been paid, or
that appellant is exempt from paying such fees because of stated reasons;
(4) That all appellate filing fees have been paid, or that appellant is exempt from paying such
fees because of stated reasons; and
(5) That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,
and that in all cases referred to in Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code, service has been made upon
the attorney general of the state of Idaho. The appellant shall not be required to certify the
payment of estimated fees in criminal appeals, appeals from denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, or petitions for post-conviction relief, if the district court has entered an order, or
thereafter enters an order within 14 days of filing the notice of appeal, that such costs shall be at
county expense.
(m) Amended Notice of Appeal. In the event the original.notice of appeal erroneously states any
of the information and requirements of this rule or additional facts arise after the filing of the
initial notice of appeal, the appellant may thereafter file an amended notice of appeal correctly
setting forth the facts and information. The amended notice of appeal shall indicate changes
from the original notice of appeal by means of strikethroughs and underlining. An amended
notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the district court in the same manner as the
original notice of appeal but no filing fee shall be required. If the original notice of appeal was
timely filed from an appealable judgment, order or decree, the amended notice of appeal will
relate back to the date of filing of the original notice of appeal. If the amended notice of appeal
includes a request for preparation of additional transcripts, the notice must include an estimate of
the number of additional pages requested and a certification that the amended notice has been
served on each reporter of whom a request for additional transcript is made. Except in capital
cases, an amended notice of appeal may not be filed after the record has been filed with the
Supreme Court.
(n) Signature. The name and signature of the attorney for the appellant, or name of appellant if
the appellant does not have an attorney.
(o) Form. The notice of appeal shall be in substantially the following form:

SA.-10

Click here for form.
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1,
1978; amended April 11, 1979, effective July 1, 1979; amended December 27, 1979, effective
July 1, 1980; amended April 18, 1983, effective July 1, 1983; amended March 30, 1984,
effective July 1, 1984; amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987; amended March 27,
1989, effective July 1, 1989; amended March 26, 1992, effective July 1, 1992; amended April 3,
1996, effective July 1, 1996; amended January 30, 2001, effective July 1, 2001; amended March
24, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; amended January 3, 2008, effective March 1, 2008; amended
February 4, 2008, effective March 1, 2008; amended March 19, 2009, effective July 1, 2009;
amended January 4, 2010, effective February 1, 2010, amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1,
2010; amended March 18, 2011, effective July 1, 2011; amended November 20, 2012, effective
January 1, 2013.)

Idaho Appellate Rule 15. Cross-Appeal After an Appeal.

(a) Right to cross-appeal. After an appeal has been filed, a timely cross-appeal may be filed
from any interlocutory or final judgment or order. If no affirmative relief is sought by way of
reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order, an issue may be presented by the
respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal.
(b) Time for filing. A cross-appeal, as a matter of right, may be made only by physically filing
the notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the district court or administrative agency within the
42 day time limit prescribed in Rule 14, as it applies to the judgment or order from which the
cross-appeal is taken, or within 21 days after the date of filing of the original notice of appeal,
whichever is later.
(Adopted March 27, 1989, effective July 1, 1989; amended March 1, 2004,effective July 1, 2004,
amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
JUDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on May 10, 2010, granting Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court having previously entered its Order
Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the First and Third Causes of Action of
Plaintiffs Complaint on April 21, 2010. Therefore, entry of Judgment concerning all claims
against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP is now proper.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered under the standards of the Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, DISMISSING Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint against Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP, in its entirety and WITH PREJUDICE.

JUDGMENT- I

f
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Attorney fees and costs of litigation, if any, will be assessed and ordered in a manner
consistent with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED thi~g day of May, 2010.

District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6~ay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
~ ~ O , I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, \Vashington 99201

_}{_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

~

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177

L

James D. LaRue
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 384-5844
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;

QRDER RE MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT INF AVOR OF RICHARD A.
RILEY AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION

Defendants.
This matter came on for oral argument on January 26, 2015, on the Motion for Entry of
Judgment in favor of Richard A. Riley and Rule 54(b) Certification and the Motion for Entry of
Amended Judgment in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP and Rule 54(b)
Certification. Loren C. Ipsen appeared on behalf of defendants Richard A. Riley and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. Roderick C. Bond appeared on behalf of plaintiff Reed J. Taylor.
Good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Entry of Judgment in favor of Richard A.
'

Riley is hereby GRANTED and Richard A. Riley's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is hereby
DENIED.

ORDER- I
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Entry of Amended Judgment in favor Of
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP is hereby DENIED and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's request for an award of
attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in responding to the motions under I.R.C.P. 11 is
hereby DENIED.
DATED this

ORDER-2

.j__<( day of February, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to
manner indicated below:
/

"(I
J
,2015, I caused a true
e served upon the following in the

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

---

Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

_L U.S. Mail

Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701-2837
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

----

--

---/
-----_L_

-----

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail
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CHRISTOPHE.-.,._,.....-.c,f,~IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O°PYJl1!Jlill¥.J.0FI

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.

.

Attorney fees and costs of litigation will be assessed and ordered in a manner consistent
with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Supreme Court 2014 Opinion No.
86.
DATED this

J.i_ day of

r;..l,11 Y
A.'¥
J

, 2015.

JUDGMENT-I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this U day of rf
2015, I caused a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be"served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
/
--

Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery
- - Federal Express
- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

_L U.S. Mail

---

---

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701-2837

-/ -----

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

/

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

/

------

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail
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Rr"EIVED

JIJN 11 2015

JUL O8 2015

Ada County Clerk

CHRISTOPHE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFsfltliE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
AMENDED JUDGMENT

v.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs.and
attorney fees in the amount of$239,265.25.
DATED thisc:9

r-

day of June, 2015.

AMENDED JUDGMENT- 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_§_ day ofn!115, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
,

Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

/
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--

--I

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

I

--

-----

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

I

I

Keeley E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
P. 0. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83 707

--

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

--

----

I,

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail
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- - Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DIST

/

I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

\'

!

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
AMENDED ruDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McK.LVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, against Reed J.
Taylor for costs and attorney fees in the amount of $25,029.00.
DATED this

.JS_ day of June, 2015.

AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_!_ day o f ~ 2015, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
jndicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

_::! U.S. Mail

----

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

I
----

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

--

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

--J

/

Keeley E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
P. 0. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83707

--

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

_L U.S. Mail

---
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---

---
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
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CHR1s·roPHEA D. RICH, Cls,rk

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558
JOHN M. AVONDET, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com

By HALEY MYERS
DEPUTY

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, AN INDIVIDUAL;
CASENO.: CV-OC-2009-18868
PLAINTIFF,
STIPULATION

V.
RICHARD A. RILEY, AN INDIVIDUAL;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIP; SHARON CUMMINGS,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; AND
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, AN IDAHO
CORPORATION;
DEFENDANTS.

STIPULATION -1

006305

SA. - 23

.,

· The Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Taylor"), Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow ("Cummings") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"), through their undersigned counsel, stipulate as follows:

1.

Taylor's claims against Eberle Berlin and Cummings shall be dismissed with

prejudice and without an award of attorneys' fees, expert fees or costs to any party.
2.

Taylor, Eberle Berlin and Cummings authorize the Court to enter the order attached

hereto as Exhibit A.
DATED this 28th day of August, 2015.

By:_-1-::9111,--==--~----Michael D.
ffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

By:'=l._,.-"M.~<-¥/-4"'/r'/Y'----'1'~'-"""'---===-ely E. Du
Kevin A. Gr·
Attorneys for Defendants Cummings and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen

STIPULATION - 2

006306
SA.-24

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558
JOHN M. A VONDET, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
REMAINING CLAIMS WITHOUT AN
A WARD OF FEES OR COSTS TO ANY
PARTY

Defendants.

ORDER-1

Exhibit()Q6A1
SA.-25

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's claims against Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow ("Cummings") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle
_ Berlin") are hereby dismissed with prejudice and without an award of attorneys' fees, experts' fees
or costs to any party.
IT SO ORDERED.
DATED this _ _ ~ay of September, 2015.

Richard D. Greenwood, District Court Judge

ORDER-2

Exhibit0@6As
SA.-26

.
i

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,
, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served
a true and correct copy of the forgoing Order on the following persons via the methods indicated
below:

Keely E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
1087 West River Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 7387
Boise, Idaho 83707

James D. LaRue
Loren· C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83 704

Michael D. Gaffney
John M. Avondet
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
601 108th Avenue NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Messenger

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Messenger

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Messenger

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Messenger

Signed this _ _ day of September, 2015, at Boise, Idaho.

Deputy Court Clerk

ORDER-3
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FILED?-..," _
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·'~---------..JP""'-.~

~~o

~\

~'tY . ,,9
~~~ '~ri-a#D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558

SEP 18 2015

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KA11'1Y PATARO
DEPUTY

c,~M.AVONDET, ISB No. 7438
~O~ BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
V.

· RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
REMAINING CLAIMS WITHOUT AN
AWARD OF FEES OR COSTS TO ANY
PARTY

Defendants.

ORDER-I

006310

SA. - 28

..

·,

.
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's claims against Sharon Cummings, Personal _Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow ("Cummings") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle
Berlin") are hereby dismissed with prejudice and without an award of attorneys' fees, experts' fees
or costs to any party.

IT SO ORDERED.
DATED this

J."f

day of Sept

r, 2015.

ORDER-2

006311

SA.-29

----..._,
!

FILED~~'""'
-----P.M.____
t.)L)'\-'_.....,...

SEP 18 2015
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY PATARO
O&flUTY

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com

Kevin A. Griffiths
ISB #8187; kag<@dukescanlan.com

DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
1087 West.River Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 7387
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 342-3310
Facsimile: (208) 342-3299
Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative ofthe Estate of
Robert M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
¥'Clim---.......

~

..........

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IpAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 0918868

vs.

JUDGMENT
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT-I

006313

SA. - 30

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is entered as to all claims against Defendants Sharon Cummings, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered, which are dismissed with prejudice.

DATEDthis (':; dayof

~s

, 2015.

JUDGMENT-2

006314

SA. - 31

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

: I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ y
\12015, I caused to be
served a true copy of the foregoing document, by the methoindicatedbeiow, and addressed to
each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE PLLC
601 108th Avenue NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Telephone (425) 591-6903

Attorneys/or Plaintiff
Michael D. Gaffney
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Telephone (208) 523-5171

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

L]

Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile (425) 321-0343
D Email
. rod@roderickbond.com

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

IT Hand Delivered
D
D
D

Attorneys for Plaintiff
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
ELAM BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
Telephone (208) 343-5454

Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 529-9732
Email
gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com

M U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
D
D
D
'

Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 384-5844
Email
jdl@elamburke.com
lci@elamburke.com

Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley
Keely E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
1087 West River Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 7387
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone (208) 342-3310

i:sY U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered

D
D
D

Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 342-3299
Email
ked@dukescanlan.com
kag@dukescanlan.com

Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative ofthe Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
Clerk

JUDGMENT-3

006315

SA.-32

.

...
A.M - - - F - 1L__.~:

)

£1) )0)

OCT O9 2015
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~~ b~CH, ~lark
By KATHY PATARO

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

oePUTY

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,

v.

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN~ CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs and
attorney fees in the amount of $239,26~

DATED this

U

day of

C

, 2015.

~ FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - I
006319

SA. - 33

RULE54ili)CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.RC.P., that the court has determined
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate

~

Rules.
DATED this

(J___ day o f ~

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2

006320

SA. - 34

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ Y of([) l ~ o l 5 , I caused a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in
the manner indicated below:

X-

Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

U.S. Mail
Hand
Delivery
-Federal
Express
-Facsimile
Transmission
-- - E-mail

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

A-

U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery
- - Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
-- E-mail
--

Keeley E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
P. 0. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83707

U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery
- - Federal Express
- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand
Delivery
-Federal
Express
-- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail

-X-

*

Deputy Clerk

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3

006321

SA.· 35

~:.1<1) l ~

A.M---F-I-L..

OCT O9 2015
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS'mJfis1,~eAffi RICH, Clerk
By KATHY PATARO

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

oePUTY

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an indivi~ual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.

~·

:..

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

~
. .
'
',·

·.,,,;..

The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

~:fl...

Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP against Reed J.
Taylor for costs and attorney fees
DATED this

{_p

dar of

$25,029.00.

,

2015.

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1
006316

SA.· 36

RULE54~)CERTIF1CATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
DATED this

.fL_ day of_,,C.....--~----·

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2
006317

SA. - 37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

0~.

· I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~day of
2015, I caused a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in
the manner indicated below:
I

l

Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

U.S. Mail
Hand
Delivery
-Federal
Express
-Facsimile Transmission
-- E-mail
--

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

A-

U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery
- - Federal Express
- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail

Keeley E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
P. 0. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83707

~ U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery
Federal Express
-- Facsimile
Transmission
-E-mail
-r

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

~

---

--

---

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

Deputy Clerk

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3
006318

SA.· 38

.

.

u9~'JFIL~:

----

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFt.f4&0 3 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ByKATHYPATARO
DEPllTY

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
[Defendant Riley]

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McK.LVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs and
attorney fees in the amount of$243,015.25.
DATED this

l

day of March; 2016.

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Riley] - 1

006728

SA. - 39

.

.
'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this % ~ y of March, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

_JL U.S. Mail

----

--

.Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-~ail

~ U.S. Mail

--

--

---

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Riley] - 2

006729

SA. - 40

____

.....
A.M

9.b'JF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IL~.:,

CWAffi 2016

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF $Ytt\sTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY PATARO
DEPUTY

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
[Defendant Hawley Troxell]

v.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McK.LVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants .
.JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiff's Comp\aint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP against Reed J.
Taylor for costs and ~ttorney fee~ in the amount of $28,779.00.
DATED this_:}_ day of March, 2016.

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Hawley Troxell] • 1
006724

SA. - 41

-.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ y of March, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:

i

Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal
Express
-Facsimile
Transmission
-- - E-mail

Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

+
-----

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
· Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Hawley Troxell] - 2

006725
SA.-42

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorney for Appellant Reed J. Taylor
IN THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Docket No.: 43686

APPELLANT,
District Court Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; AND
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;

APPELLANT REED J. TAYLOR'S MOTION
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD

RESPONDENTS.

The Appellant Reed J. Taylor ("Taylor") hereby respectfully moves the Court to augment
the record on this appeal as follows:
"Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment... [the] clerk's record ... Such a
motion shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds for the request and
attaching a copy of any document sought to be augmented." I.A.R. 30(a).
Here, this Court should grant Taylor's motion to augment the record on appeal with:
Name of Document: Declaration of Roderick C. Bond.
Date of Filing: August 21, 2017.
Taylor respectfully requests that the record be augmented with this Declaration because the
documents and testimony addressed in the Declaration addresses the issue raised by Justice

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - 1

SA.· 43

Eismann for the first time on appeal regarding whether the partial judgment entered in favor of
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment. The emails exchanged between the
district court's clerk and the parties conclusively establishes that it was the intent of all parties that
the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was never
intended by anyone to be a final and appealable judgment. See, e.g., Evans v. City of American
Falls, 52 Idaho 7, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932) ('"In applying a judgment, if the language be in any
degree uncertain, we may properly refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order
or judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it was entered."'). In fact, the Amended Final
Judgments entered by the district court were actually prepared and provided to the district court
by counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell. (See Declaration of Roderick C. Bond attached hereto.)
In addition, other more specific reasons and authorities are addressed in Taylor's
Supplemental Appellant's Brief, which is being filed contemporaneously with this Motion.
For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant Taylor's motion to augment the record
with the attached Declaration of Roderick C. Bond, which is dated and file-stamped August 21,
2017 and separately numbered starting with "Aug. p. 1" as provided under I.A.R. 30(a).
A copy of this Motion and the attached Declaration of Roderick C. Bond, which is
requested to be augmented in the record, are also included in the Appendix attached to the
Supplemental Appellant's Brief for the convenience of this Court and counsel.
DATED this 21 51 day of August, 2017.
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
By:

-l?"

Roderick C. Bond, ISB No. 8082
Attorney for Appellant Reed J. Taylor

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - 2

SA.· 44

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of August, 2017, I caused to be served
true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the following parties via the method(s)
indicated below:

Jeffrey A. Thomson
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement)

Rodenck C. Bond

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - 3

SA.-45

Electronically Filed
8/21/2017 4:42 AM
Fourth Judicial District. Ada County
Christopher D. Rich. Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
60 l I 08th Ave. NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@rodcrickbond.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO. TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual:
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff~
DECLARATION OF RODERICK C. BOND
V.

RICHARD A. RILEY. an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMTNGS. Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLTN. KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED.
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare:
1.

I am the attorney for the plaintiff Reed Taylor in this action, over the age of eighteen

and am competent to testify in court, including as to the matters set forth in this declaration. This
declaration is based on my personal knowledge.
2.

At the oral argument held for the appeal in the above-referenced action on August

17, 2017, Justice Eismann raised the issue of whether Reed Taylor's motion for reconsideration
was timely since it was not made within 14 days of the entry of the judgment entered in favor of
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. This is the first time this issue has arisen in this case.
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3.

As J have previously testified, Reed Taylor entered into a confidential settlement

agreement with Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow that resolved Mr. Taylor's claims against
them. Richard Riley (''Riley'') and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ('·Hawley Troxell'')
were not parties to that Agreement or to the Stipulation later executed between Mr. Taylor, Eberle
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow to dismiss Mr. Taylor's claims against them. That Stipulation
between Mr. Taylor, Eberle Berlin and Turnbow was later filed on September l l, 2015.
4.

After the Stipulation, order for dismissal and partial judgment were submitted to

this Court for filing and entry, this Court through Ms. Kathy Pataro, confirmed to the parties that
the Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbo\v judgment was not a final judgment in an email sent on
September 18, 2015. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the email from Kathy
Pataro dated September 18, 2015, which ,vas sent to all counsel in this case confirming this Comt's
intent that the Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbow judgment was not intended to be a final
judgment. This email con finned to me what Thad already believed-that the judgment in favor of
Eberle Berlin and Turnbow was not a final and appealable judgment for the case and that it was
simply a partial consent judgment. This email was sent at 11 :32 AM, which was before the consent
partial judgment was later filed in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow at 3:06 PM.
5.

On September 19, 2015, I responded to Ms. Pataro·s email (Exhibit A) and advised

her that l would see if the parties could agree on the form of a final judgment. Attached as Exhibit
fl. is a true and correct copy of my email to Ms. Pataro dated September 19, 2015. That email was

also carbon copied to all counsel for record.
6.

On September 19.2015 (shortly after Tsent the email in Exhibit B), I emailed Loren

Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths regarding agreeing on a proposed final judgment. It was
my belief that the final judgment needed to include all relief as to all parties in a single judgment,
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or, alternatively, because we had settled with Eberle Berlin and Turnbow, that the district court
could enter Rule 54(b) judgments for Riley and Hawley Troxell as had been indicated in Ms.
Pataro 's email (Exhibit A). Although I believed that it was appropriate to either enter one final
judgment that included the claims for relief and all parties as provided under Rule 54(a) (i.e., Riley,
Hawley Troxell, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow) or enter separate Rule 54(b) partial final
judgments in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell as this Court had indicated it would do, Tthought
that a final judgment that included all of the parties and the previous amounts awarded to Riley
and Hawley Troxell was the cleaner way, especially since Mr. Taylor would be appealing and
would need to post security if there was no agreement bet,:veen the parties. Attached as Exhibit C
is a true and correct copy of my email to Loren Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths dated
September 19, 2015.
7.

On September 21, 2015, I received an email from Loren Ipsen confinning that he

and his clients did not want to agree to submit a final judgment that included all parties and all of
the claims and requested relief as I had suggested in my email (Exhibit C). Attached as Exhibit D
is a true and correct copy of Loren Ipsen's email dated September 21, 2015. This email confirmed
to me that Loren Ipsen and his clients did not believe nor were maintaining that the partial
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final and appealable
judgment.
8.

On September 21, 2015 (later the same day that I received Exhibit D), I received

an email from Loren Ipsen's assistant, Nichole Pappas, with two proposed Rule 54(b) judgments
for Riley and Hawley Troxell. Attached as Exhibit E are true and correct copies of Ms. Pappas'
email dated September 21, 2015 (which was sent to all counsel) and the attached proposed Rule
54(b) ''Final Amended Judgments" for Riley and Hawley Troxell. The attached "Final Amended
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Judgements., were the same identical judgments that th is Court later signed and entered on October
9. 2015. In other words, this Court entered the "Final Amended Judgments'' prepared and
submitted by counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell.
9.

On September 22, 2015. I emailed Kathy Pataro to inform this Court that the

proposed ··final Amended Judgments'' in Exhibit E, which were submitted by Hawley Troxell and
Riley, were not agreed to by me or Mr. Taylor. That said, as I mentioned above, l believed that the
"Final Amended Judgments" were one of two possible ways to ensure a final judgment was entered
so that Mr. Taylor could appeal. Attached as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of my September
22, 2015 email to Kathy Pataro, which was carbon copied to all counsel in this lawsuit.

10.

From the time when Ms. Pataro first emailed all of us regarding the entry of a final

judgment on September 18, 2015 through the date of this Declaration, no one (including counsel
for Riley and Hawley Troxell) ever complained about the Amended Final Judgments that were
entered for Hawley Troxell and Riley at the urging of their counsel or alleged that the consent
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow on September 18, 2015 was
a final and appealable judgment. In addition, no one (including counsel for Riley and Hawley
Troxell) ever complained or alleged that Mr. Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the
declarations submitted in support of that motion were not timely because they were not submitted
within 14 days of the entry of the consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate
of Turnbow. The first time anyone has mentioned anything about these issues was when Justice
Eismann raised the issue at oral argument on August 17, 2017.
11.

Based on the above testimony and the attached Exhibits A-F, I believed that this

Court, the undersigned counsel, and counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell were all proceeding
under the intent and belief that the September 18, 2015 partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle
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Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final judgment, as was further confirmed by this
Comt's subsequent entry of the two ·'Final Amended Judgments" in favor of Riley and Hawley
Troxell. Everyone proceeded under the belief that a final judgment was necessary and the Comt
ultimately signed the ··Amended Final Judgments" (certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b)), which
were submitted by counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell. I was never concerned that this Court or
counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell would try to maintain that the Eberle Berlin and Estate of
Turnbow partial judgment would be construed as a final judgment.
12.

After the "Amended Final Judgments" were entered in favor of Riley and Hawley

Troxell, I continued to proceed in the manner consistent \Vith those judgments being the only final
and appealable judgments in this lawsuit and. thus, proceeded in preparing, filing and serving Mr.
Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the declarations submitted in suppo1t of that motion with
the understanding that they needed to be filed and served within 14 days of the entry of those
·'Amended Final Judgments'' on October 9, 2015. Had Tbelieved that anyone would be maintaining
that the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final
and appealable judgment, then I would have filed Mr. Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the
supporting declarations within 14 days of that judgment. I have never missed a deadline for filing
a motion for reconsider.

August 21. 2017 at Bellevue, WA
Date and City and State Signed
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of August, 2017, I caused to be served
true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the following parties via the method(s)
indicated below (and to the extent that the below parties have consented, service will also be made
through the iCourt E-Filing System to the parties at the email addresses indicated belO\v):
Via:

Keely E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL PLLC
l 087 West River Street, Suite 300
Boise, lD 83 707

James D. LaRue
Jeff A. Thomson
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83 704
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( )
( )
( )
(X)
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - (208) 342-3299
Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement)
ked(Zi:dukescanlan.com
kag,a1dukescanlan.com

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile - (208) 384-5844
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement)
jdl(ii:elamburke.com
iata;elamburke.com
lci(d:elamburke.com
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Roderick Bond
From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:

Kathy Pataro <kpataro@adaweb.net>
Friday, September 18, 2015 11 :32 AM
lci@elamburke.com
Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com); Roderick Bond; 'Mike Gaffney'
CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley

Good afternoon - I needed to touch base with you on this case. Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and
judgment in regards to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an amended judgment and Rule 54(b)
certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Kathy Pataro
In-Court Clerk for
TI1e Honorable Richard D. Greenwood
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7531
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Roderick Bond
Roderick Bond < rod@roderickbond.com >
Saturday, September 19, 2015 6:53 AM
'Kathy Pataro'; 'lci@elamburke.com'
'Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com)'; 'Mike Gaffney'
RE: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley

From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:

Thanks for the email Kathy. I will reach out to Keely and Loren to see if we can all agree on the
form of a final judgment as to all parties and then get something to the Judge. Thanks.
Rod

Roderick Bond
law Office, PU.C

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
601 108th Ave. NE. Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Website: www.roderickbond.com

From: Kathy Pataro [mailto:kpataro@adaweb.net]
Sent: Friday, September 18, 2015 11:32 AM
To: lci@elamburke.com
Cc: Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com) <ked@dukescanlan.com>; Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com>; 'Mike
Gaffney' <gaffney@beardstclair.com>
Subject: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley

Good afternoon - I needed to touch base with you on this case. Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and
judgment in regards to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an amended judgment and Rule 54(b)
certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Kathy Pataro
In-Court Clerk for
The Honorable Richard D. Greenwood
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7531

1
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Roderick Bond
From:

Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com>
Saturday, September 19, 2015 6:56 AM
'lci@elamburke.com'; 'Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com)'; 'Kevin Griffiths'
'Mike Gaffney'; 'javondet@beardstclair.com'

Sent:
To:

Cc:

Loren and Keely:
In light of Kathy's email, I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's
signature. I think that the judgment would simply combine what is the judgment that was
recently submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment previously entered for HTEH
and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do you both think?
Rod

Boderick Bond
Law Office, PU.C

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
601 103th Ave. NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Website: www.roderickbond.com
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Roderick Bond
From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:

Loren Ipsen <lci@elamburke.com>
Monday, September 21, 2015 10:50 AM
Roderick Bond; 'Keely Duke'; 'Kevin Griffiths'
'Mike Gaffney'; javondet@beardstclair.com
RE: Hawley Troxell

Hi Rod,
Thanks for your offer, but it appears from Kathy Pataro's email that the Court has already signed the proposed order and
judgment, which I assume relate to the Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin. Therefore, I think it would be simpler for us
just to submit final judgments for Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley as suggested by the Court.
Regards,
Loren Ipsen
From: Roderick Bond [mailto:rod@roderickbond.com]

Sent: Saturday, September 19, 2015 7:56 AM
To: Loren Ipsen <lci@elamburke.com>; 'Keely Duke' <ked@dukescanlan.com>; 'Kevin Griffiths'

<KAG@dukescanlan.com>
Cc: 'Mike Gaffney' <gaffney@beardstclair.com>; javondet@beardstclair.com

Subject:

Loren and Keely:
In light of Kathy's email, I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's
signature. I think that the judgment would simply combine what is the judgment that was
recently submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment previously entered for HTEH
and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do you both think?
Rod

Roderick Bond

~w Office, PllC

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
601 1081h Ave. NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Website: www.roderickbond.com
Thi., email and ;Jny att,Jchrnenb m,;y be attorni::y<i1ent pnv:leg,d, protected as Gttorn12y work prodL1ct .. and/or subject to ,Jny other ;,pplirnbie
p(;ii!ege.,. Th,, unauthori,ed viewing or- di::.s<"cmmat.ion of any ernail or att.ai.:hrnent is prohibit.f:'d. If you have l"<·ceived this ern;iil in error or it was,
riot intended to be delivered to you, please irnnwdiately de\:'te this ern,iii ;,nd all dttachrnents and contact the sender at tr1e Jdcfress indicated
above, Thank y,11.i,
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Roderick Bond
From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Nichole Pappas <nlp@elamburke.com>
Monday, September 21, 2015 2:19 PM
Roderick Bond; gaffney@beardstclair.com; javondet@beardstclair.com; ked@dukescanlan.com;
kag@dukescanlan.com
Kayde Baird
Taylor v. Riley, et al.
doc06932020150921151443.pdf; doc06932220150921151510.pdf

Counsel:
Attached please find copies of the following:
1.
2.

Final Amended Judgment (Richard A. Riley); and
Final Amended Judgment (Hawley Troxell).

These documents will be delivered to Judge Greenwood this afternoon.
Thanks.

Nichole Pappas
Legal Assistant to Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, P.A.
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, JD 83701
(208) 343-5454
(208) 384-5844 (fax)
email website
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.

1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP against Reed J.
Taylor for costs and attorney fees in the amount of $25,029.00.
DATEDthis _ _ dayof _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,2015.

DISTRICT JUDGE

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - l
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2015.

DISTRICT JUDGE

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, 2015, I caused a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in
the manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

------

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

------

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

Keeley E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
P. 0. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83707

---

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

------

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
- - Federal Express
- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

Deputy Clerk

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs and
attorney fees in the amount of $239,265.25.
DATEDthis _ _ dayof _ _ _ _ _ _ _,2015.

DISTRICT JUDGE

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - I
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
DATEDthis _ _ dayof _ _ _ _ _ _ _,2015.

DISTRICT JUDGE

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of
, 2015, I caused a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in
the manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004

- - U.S. Mail

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

- - U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery

Keeley E. Duke
Kevin A. Griffiths
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
P. 0. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83 707

--

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

----

Hand Delivery
- - Federal Express
- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail

--

----

Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
E-mail

U.S. Mail
Hand
Delivery
-Federal
Express
-Facsimile
Transmission
-- - E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
- - Facsimile Transmission
- - E-mail

Deputy Clerk

FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3
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Roderick Bond
Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com>
Tuesday, September 22, 2015 4:33 PM
'Kathy Pataro'; 'lci@elamburke.com'
'Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com)'; 'Mike Gaffney'; 'John Avondet'
RE: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley

From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:

Hi Kathy:
I understand that Loren Ipsen submitted two judgments. I just wanted you and Judge
Greenwood to know that Mr. Taylor's counsel did not approve those judgments. As a follow
up to my previous email to you, the parties did not work together to approve the judgments.
Rod

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
601 1081h Ave. NE, Suite 1900
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Website: www.roderickbond.com
any 2ttachrnents. rnd\ be att<Ynev-c::er,t p<viL2ged; protectc:
The

ut dnv ~>'r?ii'.

From: Kathy Pataro [mailto:kpataro@adaweb.net]

Sent: Friday, September 18, 2015 11:32 AM
To: lci@elamburke.com
Cc: Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com) <ked@dukescanlan.com>; Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com>; 'Mike
Gaffney' <gaffney@beardstclair.com>
Subject: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley

Good afternoon - I needed to touch base with you on this case. Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and
judgment in regards to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an amended judgment and Rule 54{b)
certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Kathy Pataro
In-Court Clerk for
TI1e Honorable Richard D. Greenwood
.ZOO W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7531
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